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Abstract—The use of blockchains is growing every day, and
their utility has greatly expanded from sending and receiving
crypto-coins to smart-contracts and decentralized autonomous
organizations. Modern blockchains underpin a variety of appli-
cations: from designing a global identity to improving satellite
connectivity. In our research we look at the ability of blockchains
to store metadata in an increasing volume of transactions and
with evolving focus of utilization. We further show that basic ap-
proaches to improving blockchain privacy also rely on embedding
metadata. This paper identifies and classifies real-life blockchain
transactions embedding metadata of a number of major protocols
running essentially over the bitcoin blockchain. The empirical
analysis here presents the evolution of metadata utilization in the
recent years, and the discussion suggests steps towards preventing
criminal use. Metadata are relevant to any blockchain, and our
analysis considers primarily bitcoin as a case study. The paper
concludes that simultaneously with both expanding legitimate
utilization of embedded metadata and expanding blockchain
functionality, the applied research on improving anonymity and
security must also attempt to protect against blockchain abuse.
Index Terms—bitcoin, bitcoin cash, blockchain, cryptographic
key management, embedded metadata, anonymity, privacy, ran-
somware, multisig.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of blockchains is expanding from transferring
crypto-coins to implementing smart-contracts that service a
variety of domains. IBM and Sovrin are designing and imple-
menting a global digital identity layer enabled by blockchain:
decentralized, point-to-point exchange of information about
people, organizations, or things. [1] EtherSat is developing
a protocol for satellite connectivity utilizing blockchain: a
decentralized global area network that maximizes efficiency of
existing ground-station infrastructure. [2] nChain is creating a
blockchain tokenization layer to enable interactivity and inter-
operability among smart contracts underlying various services
[3] [4]. These are only few examples of how the technology is
expanding. Throughout the initial and the expansion stages, the
ability of a blockchain to store metadata has been exploited in
an increasing volume of transactions and with evolving focus
of utilization.
A. Embedding Metadata
Reviewing historically, and based on the bitcoin blockchain
primarily, this ability at first involved creating an Unspent
Transaction Output (UTXO) that could never be spent. That
was used with a focus on permanently and securely storing
information (such as notary data) not directly related to the
current transaction. The destination bitcoin address in the lock-
ing script of such unspendable UTXO in a Pay-To-Public-Key
(P2PK) and Pay-To-Public-Key-Hash (P2PKH) transactions
was used as a freeform 20-byte field to store metadata, and
the the transaction was recorded on the blockchain. [5] Then,
concerns were raised that the unspendable outputs could never
be removed from the UTXO database, causing the database
to increase forever. In response, Bitcoin Core version 0.9
introduced the RETURN operator, explicitly creating such
outputs as provably unspendable and excluded from the UTXO
set. [6] Simultaneously, the allowance for metadata increased
from 20 to 80 bytes. Thus, legitimate non-payment data
could be stored on the blockchain without increasing the
UTXO database. However, concerns were raised that non-
payment data stored in OP RETURN outputs could allow
meta-protocols to run permission-free with criminal intent.
That led to a large proportion of miners not processing
OP RETURN transactions, and a corresponding proportion
of metadata not being recorded on the blockchain. The more
recent trend is storing information in the redeem script of pay-
to-script-hash (P2SH) transactions. P2SH were standardized
with Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP): 16, as a powerful
new type of transactions that simplifies the use of complex
script. [7] The hash of the redeem script is restricted to 20
bytes, but the script itself and the size of metadata are not
restricted. These transactions are spendable, and the full script
must be revealed when spending a P2SH UTXO. At this stage,
the utilization of embedded metadata is focused on variety of
applications such as tokenization, blockchain-enforced smart
contracts, and related access to secure databases. Some con-
cerns about ransomware remain.
Among the innovative uses of P2SH-embedded metadata are
the tokenization of assets (tangible, intangible, divisible, and
non-divisible), the blockchain-enforcement of smart contracts,
the blockchain-recorded progress through the complex condi-
tionality structure of a smart contract, the efficient blockchain-
registered exchange of various tokenized entities underlying
smart contracts, and the blockchain-recorded access links and
access privileges to off-chain databases. [8] Such databases
can be Distributed Hash Table (DHT) databases that store
smart-contract templates, or conditions for the exchange of
and the characteristics of entities underlying smart contracts,
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or software programs implementing intelligent agents capable
of controlling various types of smart contracts. The described
utilization of embedded-metadata serves as middleware that
supports the development and execution of any specific smart
contract.
In this paper, we identify millions of recorded blockchain
transactions embedding metadata and classify them according
to meta-protocols they support. That allowed us to observe,
from one of its many perspectives, the broader and impor-
tant question about technology adoption. We further analyze
empirically the evolution of embedding metadata, and suggest
security steps towards preventing criminal use. Metadata are
relevant to any blockchain, and our analysis is based on
bitcoin primarily. Bitcoin has long historical data and the
largest market-share, but is considered inert to innovation in
more recent years.1 Our conclusion is that simultaneously with
both expanding legitimate utilization of embedded metadata
and expanding blockchain functionality, the applied research
on improving anonymity and security must continue with
protecting against blockchain abuse.
B. Ecosystems
Bitcoin is the first and has long been the most popular cryp-
tocurrency and blockchain. All B-transactions are recorded in
the immutable, append only, blockchain data-structure, where
the key features and elements include: blocks, transactions
stored in the blocks, and inputs, outputs, lock-time included
in each transaction according to the transactions’ format.
The unspent outputs UTXO are monitored by the miners in
validating transactions, and each input and output contain
scripts – locking, unlocking, redeem scripts. [9] Depending
on the type of transaction – P2PK, P2PKH, multisig, P2SH
– the scripts may contain public keys, hashed public keys,
multiple public keys, signatures based on private keys, multiple
signatures, metadata, hashed metadata, and OP codes. The
entire transaction is hashed using SHA-256 and this hash
typically serves as a globally unique Transaction ID (TXID).
[10]
The bitcoin script language Script is a Forth-like stack-based
execution language. Each transaction is processed by every
bitcoin validating node and the node’s validation software
executes, independently for each of the transaction’s inputs,
the unlocking script in the input alongside a corresponding
UTXO’s locking script. A transaction is valid if the cryp-
tographic puzzles in all UTXO referenced by its inputs are
solved by the inputs’ scripts, i.e. all spending conditions are
satisfied. Then these UTXO are removed from the UTXO
database but remain permanently recorded on the blockchain.
[5] Script is a stateless and predictable language, and Bitcoin
Core currently includes 174 active Script opcodes (and 15
disabled) including 14 reserved opcodes, of the following
types: push-value, flow-control, stack-ops, splice-ops, bit-
logic, arithmetic, crypto, locktime, template-matching, and
reserved-words. [11] [12]
1Bitcoin has however broken grounds for crypto-currencies, and new
currencies, such as bitcoin cash BCH, are actively pursuing innovation.
The Script in the more actively innovating bitcoin-cash
BCH-blockchain is introducing further opcodes, by re-
designing and re-testing functionalities previously intended
(to an extent) by now disabled bitcoin-script opcodes, as
well as by introducing new functionalities. [13] The bitcoin-
cash network is undergoing a protocol upgrade in May 2018,
supporting on-chain scalability, new transaction signatures,
and a new difficulty adjustment algorithm. [14] The blocksize
limit is adaptable, with an increased default of 8MB, and quite
larger sizes are being tested on the bitcoin-cash testnet. [15]
A new SigHash reusable signing mechanism ensures replay
protection under a chain split, an improved hardware-wallet
security, and elimination of the quadratic hashing problem. It
provides for users creating transactions with a fork-specific ID,
which are invalid on forks lacking support for the mechanism.
[16] A new difficulty adjustment algorithm allows miners to
migrate from the bitcoin chain as desired and provides protec-
tion against hashrate fluctuations. [17] Multiple independent
teams develop bitcoin-cash software, assisted by peer-review
workgroups, in contrast to the single-group development of
Bitcoin Core. The development of bitcoin cash is decentralized
and the ecosystem is dynamic. The focus is on protocol
developments and on building Software Development Kits
(SDK) that provide for the implementation and support of
smart contracts and applications. [18]
II. IMPROVING PRIVACY AND SECURITY
Extending blockchain functionality and legitimate utiliza-
tion of embedded metadata demands effective protection
against blockchain abuse. The effective protection is supported
by active applied research on anonymity and security.
A. Privacy
Privacy is a key desirable feature of all public and some
private blockchains. Adoption and usage of bitcoin demon-
strates early developments in distributed P2P payment systems
anonymity engineering, and the privacy levels offered by
current bitcoin psuedo-anonymous ledger is not very strong
[19] [20]. Improving this is a major and difficult problem.
It is not obvious how to reconcile ledger transparency and
the desire for better privacy, and there is no easy quick-fix
solution. Some early solutions involve using one public key
only once. Using many different keys per user immediately
raises the question of key management. In order to avoid the
necessity for regular backups of fresh private keys generated
at random, deterministic key derivation functions have been
introduced. Hierarchical Deterministic (HD) wallets [21] use
Elliptic Curve mathematics in order to calculate the public
keys without revealing the private keys. HD wallets also allow
users to derive various keys in a deterministic way from a
single human readable seed. Using several keys there at the
same time, however, like joining payments made to several
keys belonging to the same user, compromises privacy. [22]
In addition to HD wallets, there exist several other methods
improving bitcoin anonymity.
• Mixes: Mixing services or tumblers can be used to
improve the anonymity of users by taking their coins
and exchanging them with coins of other users, while
hiding their identities. These services charge commissions
between 1-3 %, and also need to be trusted not to steal
users’ coins. [19].
• CoinSwap: This is a similar concept to Mixing. If Alice
wants to pay Charlie, she can send her coins to Bob
instead of Charlie, and then Charlie can send a fresh
unrelated coin to Bob. In order to resolve the theft
problem, a central authority can manage these swaps. If
any of the three misbehaves, the swap may be resolved
by using hash-locked transactions that are linkable in the
public-ledger. [20]
• Fair Exchange: This method allows the users to hide their
identities by exchanging coins. Ideally, the fair exchange
requires that either both parties involved in the transition
receive each others items or none do. [23]
• CoinJoin: In CoinJoin users collaborate and create trans-
actions where inputs of several users are mixed together.
The transaction is not valid and will not be accepted by
the network until all the signatures are provided [24].
Further methods that require attention include stealth ad-
dresses and dark wallets:
a) Stealth Address: One way to break the linkability in
blockchain is to ask a recipient for two destination addresses,
and then make two transactions and broadcast them into the
network few seconds apart [22]. This concept has been further
improved leading towards Stealth Address (SA) techniques,
which are forms of non-interactive key exchange protecting
privacy of users receiving payments. The origins of these tech-
niques could be tracked to [25] [26]. Instead of a public key,
the payee advertises a long unique static identifier, which is
used by the payer to generate one time address to send money.
A stealth address do not appear in the B-blockchain; instead,
random ephemeral public keys are generated and used. SA
addresses use the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange mechanism,
which allows the sender and receiver to exchange information
and jointly generate some ephemeral public keys. Only lower-
level derived keys will appear on the blockchain.
Fig. 1: DH key exchange in Stealth Address technique
For example, Bob advertises his (multiple-use) public key
on his web page. There exist several variants of SA addressees.
A basic method that uses permanent public/private identities of
two participants, Alice and Bob, is adapted from [27] next. We
consider a basic Diffie-Hellman key exchange, as presented in
Fig. 1. Let G be the generator point on Elliptic curve, and
let ’a’ and ’b’ be the private keys of the sender (Alice) and
the receiver (Bob), correspondingly. Alice and Bob use here
their permanent identities that will typically appear on the
blockchain (this will change in more advanced SA methods).
Alice and Bob publish a.G and b.G, correspondingly, and
keep their private keys confidential. Alice computes a.(b.G),
and Bob equivalently computes b.(a.G). Their shared secret
is S = a.(b.G) = b.(a.G) = a.b.G, which no one else can
compute. Next, Alice sends money to the transfer address E,
and Bob detects the transaction and spends its UTXO. For
example:
E = H(S).G
looks like a random B-addres. However, Bob knows the
corresponding private key as he knows the common secret
S, and can scan the bitcoin blockchain for E to appear.
This solution is still not quite secure, as Alice also knows
the private key and may spend the UTXO before Bob. An
improved asymmetric stealth address uses a stronger spending
key e. [8] For example,
E = H(S).G+ b.G and e = H(S) + b
Then, the sender Alice can no longer spend the transaction
output, and can only compute the public key E. This method
is still not ideal, as it is static and deterministic. In order to
mitigate this, the sender can replace her permanent identity a
by a random number r, and publish r.G by typically using
OP RETURN in the very next output. In this case, one-
time destination key and address are generated. This is not
yet the best SA technique, and can be improved further by
using 2 public keys, b.G and v.G, where v.G is a view key2.
Knowledge of the private part of the view key allows to build
read-only wallets that can see transactions (undo anonymity)
but cannot spend. Even a more robust stealth address has been
proposed that protects against private key compromise, due to
thefts, bad random attacks or Spectre/Meltdown type vulner-
abilities [27]. Potential further development can use metadata
based on processing various combinations of different partial
biometric features, when generating signatures and keys. [28]
Improved approaches to generating hierarchical asymmetric
ephemeral keys and addresses have also been proposed and
implemented in Nakasendo, an SDK supporting bitcoin cash
applications, as well as applications for any blockchain based
on elliptic-curve cryptography [18].
b) Dark Wallet: In order to enhance anonymity further,
light-weight wallets that use both stealth-address and CoinJoin
techniques have been created and termed Dark Wallets (DW).
[29] Stealth addresses are discussed in detail in the previous
section. A brief reminder on CoinJoin tells that a transaction
of one user is combined with that of a random other user,
who is making a payment at around the same time. Dark
wallet is currently in its alpha testing state [30], as a Chrome
2View keys are also used in Monero and other CryptoNote-based currencies,
and and were first described in [25].
extension enabled in developer mode. During this study, it has
been working on and off for brief periods of time.
B. Security
Innovative technologies are subject to abuse, as a series of
incidents have demonstrated, including the recent Facebook
data abuse by Cambridge Analitica affecting 87 million users.
[31] Blockchain has also been abused, as the ransomware
attack on UK NHS showed last year, affecting many people.
[32] The adoption of bitcoin in ransomware crime is a major
event of recent years [33]. Very recently, the first incident has
been reported, as well, of a ransomware accepting bitcoin-
cash payments. [34] In order to protect blockchain expansion
into services benefiting the society, it is necessary to address
the issue of its abuse. Innovation in terms of security and
prevention from ransomware must be an integral part in the
development of smart contracts and blockchain-based services.
Next, we briefly introduce the key ransomware types and
existing defenses. In later sections of this paper, we review
them in relation to bitcoin and bitcoin cash, and suggest some
solutions.
a) Overall Rise of Ransomware: Ransomware is a class
of malware aiming to force users to pay a ransom in order
to regain full access to their system [35]. This terminology
covers a wide range of malicious software programs, including
CryptoLocker, Locky, Cryptowall, KeyRanger, SamSam, Tel-
saCrypt, TorrentLocker and others [36] [19] The history of ran-
somware goes back to 2004, and the early software included
screen lockers that were easy to remove or circumvent. Their
level of sophistication, however, has been improving since
then. Since 2013, a more harmful type of software has been
developed. Though the programs are still called ”lockers”, they
are not just lockers but quietly search for specific files and
encrypt them, and then ask for ransom in order to decrypt.
Only in the last few years, since bitcoin raised in popularity,
ransomware has been combined with B-payments. [33] [32]
• CryptoLocker: This is a well-known ransomware, since
Sep. 2013. CryptoLocker v3 uses Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES)-128 in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
mode [36] and RivestShamirAdleman (RSA)-2048 for
encryption of a header [37]. AES-128 is a symmetric
key algorithm with 128-bit keys, and RSA-2048 is an
asymmetric encryption algorithm using 2048-bit keys.
This combination makes it most likely impossible to
decrypt, without paying the ransom.
• TorrentLocker Etc. These are different strains of ran-
somware that have used AES differently: particularly in
Counter (CTR) and CBC modes. [38]
• TeslaCrypt: This type of malware has been active since
2015, and provides customer support for the victims. It
uses Elliptic Curve cryptography (ECC), an advanced
key-derivation scheme, and has an ECC master private
key that is later made public.
• Locky: Locky is a more recent and more sophisticated
ransomware, since 2016. It uses Domain Generation Al-
gorithm (DGA) to prevent blacklisting of domain names,
as well as custom encrypted communications. Locky
also uses strong (RSA-2048 + AES-128) file encryption,
and targets and encrypts over 160 different file types,
including virtual disks, source codes and databases [39].
Locky has spread in two countries in particular, the
United States and France, and uses The-Onion-Router
(TOR) hidden servers. [36]
Further advanced ransomware techniques are discussed in
Section IV-B. A recent study by IBM reports 6,000% of overall
increase in ransomware in 2016 compared to 2015, and finds
that 70% of business victim paid the hackers. [40]
b) Ransomware Defenses: There exist a number of OS-
level countermeasures to avoid infection. Such measures in-
clude white-listing executables in user data directories [41],
avoiding mapping backup drives [38], and disrupting the
malware when using the Microsoft Crypto API [36].
• Data Backups – False Good Solution: It may seem that
all ransomware is harmless if the data is backed-up on
a regular basis and the back-up drives are encrypted.
However, the problems go far beyond, and just restoring
files or partitions from backups is not the best strategy.
This destroys forensic evidence about how the malware
propagates and how it operates, and makes the fight again
malicious software more difficult. This also leaves our
systems wide open and in the same state as before in-
fection: they can be later re-infected by malware through
the same channels. For example, a main infection channel
for Crypto-Locker was the Gameover Zeus botnet, which
had existed earlier. [41]
• Propagation of Ransomware: Computer security experts
must be able to monitor and analyze the infections. It
is very useful to know how the ransom gets here in the
first place. The problem is that there exist extensive and
offensive expertise and experience, which have emerged
over years of contrived action against the anti-virus
industry. Different types of malware infection propagation
and social engineering techniques are exploited to help
criminals diffuse their unsolicited encryption payloads.
III. USE AND ABUSE OF BLOCKCHAIN TRANSACTIONS:
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Methodology and Results
The length of OP RETURN script is currently 80 bytes,
where the first two bytes always are hex 6a, followed by
two bytes indicating the length in hex of the metadata-record
that starts from byte number 5. With its protocol upgrade
from version 1.0 to 1.1, on May 15, 2018, the OP RETURN
relay size will increase to 223 bytes, only on the bitcoin-cash
blockchain. [14] Information about the two blockchains has
been updated, corrected and analyzed in this study, by the
contributing authors, based primarily on the OpReturnTool
from [42].
The APIs of blockchain.info and coinsecrets.org are queried
by this software. Blockchain.info is used only to get the
latest block number. Then coinsecrets.org, a dedicated API
for OP RETURN transactions, is queried to extract their Time
stamp, Transaction ID, hash and ASCII code. The incoming
data are recorded into a text file and exported to Excel
[43]. Several methods were used, in order to identify the
evolution of stealth-address techniques. We have performed
experimental transactions, and further analysis on the observed
patterns, to identify potential DW transactions and patterns.
Among those that could not be related to a known protocol,
there are transactions potentially related to criminal activities.
To identify the transactions from another wallet implement-
ing stealth address, such as SX [44], its documentation has
been consulted and observed patterns inside transactions are
matched with our dataset. Overall, 22 protocols are identified
and the rest of the OP RETURN transactions are marked as
unattributed. The prefix and ASCII for all the protocols are
analyzed, and based on the analysis further three protocols
have been identified: YEJ, BITCC, and Counterparty. How-
ever, their share inside the dataset is quite slim (≈ 0%), and
only Counterparty has been included for further analysis.
Fig. 2: Time evolution of OP RETURN transactions
The first OP RETURN transaction, identified in our study,
appears on Mar. 29, 2013. This corrects [20], where the
first such transaction is identified as appearing a year later.
Thus, our dataset consists of data since Mar. 29, 2013 (block
#228596) to Jul. 6, 2017 (block #474451). In 2013, only 430
OP RETURN transactions are found, and all of them are in
the unattributed category. From 2014 to 2017, we observe
a significant increase in the volume of such transactions,
reaching over 2 million per year in 2017. (see Fig. 2) A
detailed examination shows that ≈ 51% of these transactions
correspond to the 22 known protocols, explained briefly in
Table I. About 49% of the transactions remain unattributed.
The experimental dark-wallet transactions are identified in
the unattributed section of the dataset, and have the prefix 6a-
26-06, where 6a is the opcode for OP RETURN, 26 is hex of
the length of metadata that follows, and 06 distinguishes dark-
wallet transactions from other protocols. The whole dataset is
scanned and ≈ 2762 transactions are found with this pre-fix.
The time evolution of transactions is illustrated with Fig. 3.
B. Analysis and Discussion
Linkability of transactions affects their anonymity, and sev-
eral techniques have been adapted in the B-systems to address
that issue. Approaches such as CoinJoin, Fair Exchange and
TABLE I: Protocols Using op return Opcode
Protocol Contribution(%) Usage
Unattributed 49% Not identified
Blockstore 8.5% Key value store
Factom 4.14% Notary/Doc
Omni Layer 10.3% Assets
Blocksign 0.06% Notary/Doc
Colu 10.11% Assets
Stampery 2.60% Notary/Doc
Eternity wall 0.16% Any Messages
Bitproof 0.03% Notary/Doc
Open Assets 8.09% Assets
Ascribe 2% Digital Arts
Monegraph 2.7% Digital Arts
Coinspark 1.1% Assets
Proof of Existence 0.22% Notary/Doc
Original My <0.01% Notary/Doc
Open Provenance <0.01% Proof of ownership
Remembr <0.01% Notary/Doc
Crypto copyright <0.01% Notary/Doc
LaPreuve <0.01% Notary/Doc
ProveBit <0.01% Notary/Doc
Blockchain Notary <0.01% Notary/Doc
Counterparty <0.01% Assets
Stampd <0.01% Notary/Doc
Fig. 3: Time evolution of potential DW transactions
CoinSwap, typically need a third-party involvement to achieve
anonymity, and the honesty of the third party is not guaranteed.
The latest stealth-address techniques seem currently effective.
There, the receiver advertises its static, unique identifier and
the sender generates a one-time key. There is no apparent way
that a blockchain observer can relate transactions to the same
payee. Stealth-address approaches are introduced to bitcoin
and bitcoin cash, and have been used in monero and vertcoin.
Stealth-address, dark-wallet and SX transactions appear as
unable-to-decode by block explorers.
We have identified some DW and SX transactions
among transactions unattributed to known protocols, in
the OP RETURN database we have extracted from the
blockchain. It is noted that a smaller number of SX-related
transactions are identified, as that protocol is less user-friendly
than DW. A large number of transactions remain unattributed,
and part of the issue is that meta-protocols are not required
to coordinate and register unique identifiers. Therefore, many
legitimate protocols don’t use distinctive pre-fixes [45] that
help decode/classify OP RETURN transactions they produce,
Fig. 4: The share of unattributed protocols is increasing.
and those transactions remain unattributed. This reason is even
more valid now and in foreseeable future, as the anticipated
proliferation of blockchain technology is through smart con-
tracts that benefit users rather than ransomware them, and
brings positive rather than destructive effect on society. Smart
contracts are implemented and executed through embedding
metadata in OP RETURN and P2SH transactions, and there-
fore the number of transaction with embedded metadata will
continue to rise. It is also valid to anticipate that criminals will
exploit the new functionalities. We address both these issues
in Section IV next.
IV. RANSOMWARE, KEY MANAGEMENT AND METADATA
A. Ransom Payments
Ransomware has always existed, but it has been associated
with substantial risks to receive ransom payments without
detection. With the increased popularity of Bitcoin in the
last few years, criminals have started abusing the technology,
in order to avoid detection. [46]. Receiving one or multiple
ransom payments in B allows very good initial anonymity.
[33]. A new unique B-address is created to receive payment
from each victim. As long as the coins are not yet spent, there
is no way to track who has received the ransom, and it can be
spent in the future. [35] Once spending starts, the linkability
of transactions is weakening anonymity and some transactions
could be traced. [47] However, criminals can use various
proxies, and carefully move and mix money in arbitrary ways
for a long time, in order to diminish their chances of being
traced.
Many companies and individuals will and do pay ran-
somware to get their data back, though advised the contrary by
the authorities. Some individuals bought B for the first time
when became victims of ransomware, and some companies
buy B in advance to be able to pay in case of an attack.
[46] This affects the image of the technology, as illustrated
by Google Trends during the attack on NHS last May. Fig. 5
presents the online interest in bitcoin and ransomware for the
first two quarters of last year, and identifies they both spiked
in May. [48] The image affects the development and adoption
of innovative and legitimate blockchain-based services. The
Fig. 5: Google search interests: Ransomware vs Bitcoin
January–December 2017
technology is still moving forward, however, as Fig. 5, because
the positive potential has been recognized. The target now is
decoupling and disassociation from ransomware.
B. Public Key Generation and Diversification
A variant of the Curve-Tor-Bitcoin (CTB)-Locker, targeting
web servers, generates a unique B-address for every infection.
Once the ransom is received, hackers produce a transaction
using OP RETURN and embedding a decryption key inside.
[49] Other ransomware, such as the Locky payment system,
rely on the anonymity features of TOR. It uses TOR hid-
den servers that remain operational years after the infection.
The server software, presumably operating without human
intervention, has automatically adjusted to B-price over the
years: initially asking for B2, and recently for much smaller
amounts. A Locky decryptor tool, made available to the
victims on the same TOR website when they connect again
after paying, is received on the blockchain [39]. One of the
onion servers used with Locky is twbers4hmi6dx65f.onion,
and we have observed that after payment they contain mal-
ware such as Variant.Zusy.185950. The Locky payments also
seem to be automatically aggregated into larger pots of
B50 or 100. An address associated with Locky ransom is
1Cjqt4C17sXYrWkrRyPr73RjrjZu1fuHMV, though it is not
clear if the address belongs to an exchange, a mixing service,
or is still criminally controlled. If we look from this address
backwards, the blockchain allows identifying victims of Locky
who have paid ransom in standardized amounts of B1 or 0.25.
C. Future Risks and Mitigation
The combination of all topics we study above present
a major risk: using stealth addresses, CoinJoin, TOR, and
possibly smart contracts, in order to further automate and
streamline the process of ransom threat and payment. We
are not there yet but in future, criminals can hide their
identity behind the increasing number of active blockchain
participants, while shuffling money around. Dark wallet has
Fig. 6: Share of unattributed protocols.
been a prominent B-wallet [30] focusing on anonymity. It
implements stealth-address with CoinJoin techniques. Yet DW
deployment has raised concerns about its potential abuse. [29]
This study has analyzed DW transactions and found that they
cannot be associated with known protocols. The number of
DW transactions is still low: the wallet is in its alpha state
and has not recently been operating properly. [30] It can be
expected, however, that a more dangerous DW-successor will
be inevitably created. [26] We propose that companies using
blockchain to implement complex protocols, should provide
means of audit capable of distinguishing legitimate traffic they
produce from potentially criminal activity.
Though bitcoin and bitcoin cash are studied here, all
blockchains are imminently subject to abuse, and fall within
the wider range of FinTech and SocTech technology targeted
with criminal intent. Bitcoin has existed longer and had the
largest market-share among blockchains. On the one hand,
it has traversed through challenges to bring visibility to the
technology and recognition of its potential, and opportunities
to and drive for emerging competition. On the other hand, this
position has made bitcoin most targeted by criminal activity:
the wider and more active is a blockchain network, the better it
can be both used and abused. Empirical history has also shown
that the more a cryptocurrency is used, the more valuable it is.
Further blockchains are getting momentum and raising their
market-share, and are imminently attracting criminal intent.
The other case-study in this paper, bitcoin cash, is representa-
tive of recently set up but high-momentum blockchains, and
has risen to 4th market-share. Only one ransomware has been
reported using bitcoin cash, seven months after its launch.
This contributes to the observation that relative maturity is
a precondition for targeted abuse of a blockchain.
With this paper, we raise the requirement that security
and robustness against ransomware and other abuse must be
of equal priority in innovation as are functionalities directly
impacting market-share. Another factor is the rate of inno-
vation itself. For example, blockchain cash is supported by
several rather than one development team, and releasing a
new protocol this May that introduces new op-codes, increases
blocksize, and provides a new algorithm stepping towards
blockchains’ interoperability. The need for innovation has been
a main reason for the bitcoin cash fork. The development
teams have started releasing SDKs to support the blockchain
community in implementing higher-level apps, as well. Mul-
tiple teams and continuous innovation contribute to resistance
to abuse. We have to note that a large part of identified
transactions without attributed protocols are associated with
legitimate meta-protocols, but there is no registry of meta-
protocols to serve as a reference for identification. The use of
P2SH transactions and the development of smart contracts are
trends for a foreseeable future, and will expand significantly
the range of meta-protocols. Therefore, we suggest that an
off-chain DHT registry of meta-protocols is set up, and a
corresponding unique indicator/identifier for each type of pro-
tocol is embedded in transactions that use/implement it. The
DHT repository will have secure selective access, so that the
meta-protocols are not compromised but allow corresponding
level of audit. We anticipate that with the proliferation of
smart contracts, the legitimate types of meta-protocols will
greatly outnumber malicious ones. However, the system will
still be vulnerable to large-scale outlier cyber-attacks, if deci-
sive, expert, priority solutions are not developed, maintained
and updated. If anticipation is that criminals will use smart
contracts, then monitoring smart contracts can be developed
to identify, protect against, and prevent their activity.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses blockchain adoption from the per-
spective of the evolution and utilization of metadata, and
therefore, from the perspective of the evolution of proto-
cols that are implemented and executed through embedding
additional information in blockchains. We identify, analyze
and discuss reasons for the role of metadata, including em-
pirical analysis; and suggest approaches towards protecting
the expanding blockchain functionality against criminal abuse
and ransomware. Challenges, in terms of exploiting/improving
anonymity and prioritizing/raising security, are clearly stated,
and intended and unintended consequences are addressed.
We review key characteristics of ransomware and of expert
approaches protecting against it. The paper suggests that
blockchains should provide some level of transparency of what
they are used for. We need to improve the auditability of
blockchain transactions and smart-contract protocols. This can
be facilitated for example by DHT databases of protocols,
with secure and selective authorization or audit access. An-
other major lesson learned from our research on blockchain
technology adoption and on metadata usage in blockchains,
is to see that new technology must innovate and change all
the time in order to near its full potential and that protocols
and usage of blockchains must evolve with time. We need to
continue to improve privacy of blockchains, while mitigating
and monitoring their problematic or maybe criminal usage.
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